In this paper, I assume that global intergovernmental organizations (GIGOs) function as "enablers" of interstate liberal politics by way of their multilateral institutional frameworks. To support this view, I recall and adapt the classical concept of "polyarchy," coined in the early 1950s by Robert A. Dahl. It consists of a two-dimensional theoretical construct applicable for measuring the level of liberalization in modern political societies. It follows that the more actors who take part in politics, and the more that institutions allow political opposition, the more open a society (of states) is likely to be. I thus wish to assess and rate the level of "polyarchization" of 23 GIGOs that cover various issue areas and fit some specific criteria (for example, more than one hundred member states from at least three different continents). The methodology section includes a scorecard that I have specially developed to help achieve these research objectives.
265/2015
GIGA Working Papers among nations. So if there is not an instance of power above or beyond states, (structural) anarchy will prevail. It is up to each state to control its own jurisdiction and the use of force within its borders.
This modern international system (also termed "Westphalian") is extensively based on the notion of territorial sovereignty and the horizontal relationship among states (as opposed to the "vertical" relationship between the ruler and the ruled seen at the domestic level).
Martin Wight (1966) even claimed that what one identified as "international politics" should actually be termed "diplomatics," since there is no public space in the world dedicated to sovereign nations, but only interactions, on a more or less regular basis, between their diplomatic corps (or armed forces, when diplomacy fails). Kenneth Waltz (1979) postulated that the modern international system was not the result of deliberate policy choices, but rather a delicate balance reached among states as a result of their efforts at national survival and to constrain each other into some compromise.
This mechanistic and sovereigntist perspective became more nuanced over the years and was accompanied by profound reconfigurations in the field of international studies. Although no actor capable of overpowering the modern nation-state has been acknowledged to date, we can already identify new loci of authority that compete with the "territorial sovereignty" paradigm, injecting new political content and interfering with the course of international relations. Some authors have used the term "governance without government" (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Young 1999) to describe the fluidity of political authority in the contemporary world. Government is usually used to refer to the activities supported by formal authorities -for example, the police power that ensures the implementation of duly established policies. Governance refers to those activities underpinned by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal responsibilities and do not necessarily require police power to be put into practice. According to James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992) , governance is a broader concept than government, as the former does not necessarily have to be carried out by the latter.
Noting the fragmentation and multiplicity of relations of political authority in contemporary politics, Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker (2002) developed the concept of "private authority." While the term "political authority" was, over the course of modernity, usually linked to the management of public affairs, the authors realized that some private entities have recently begun to exercise authority and influence with respect to a growing number of international issues. Actors from the private sector are not only important for the international economy but have also become critically relevant in matters involving multiple areas of systemic governance. These agents have been involved in, among other things, the establishment of social norms, the provision of welfare, the safeguarding of contracts, peacekeeping, and bioethics. Not by coincidence, Hall and Biersteker (2002) pointed out the emergence of private authority as an unequivocal sign of global governance. Even though such private authority almost never exceeds the authority of the nation-state, for the authors it is increas-GIGA Working Papers 265/2015 ingly important in understanding the political dynamics of international relations -which today include actors as diverse as states, market players, international organizations, transnational movements, mafias, churches, etc.
The complexity of this "global governance without a world government" framework has been intensified recently by the debate about political legitimacy in international relations.
The question that recurrently arises is as follows: If there is "governance without government" on a global scale, where does it derive its legitimate authority? Even assuming that democracy is the preferred political regime and the source of procedural legitimacy for most domestic constituencies, some serious theoretical pitfalls still remain when organizations operate according to democratic formulas within the ambit of the modern system of states.
Current International Relations Research
In the current stage of international relations, the emergence of global issues that potentially affect the entire planet has required new public policies that traditional territorial states might find difficult to carry out. These issues require international and cross-border approaches, since their causes and effects are no longer restricted to certain states, regions, or groups of states. In sum, the contemporary problematic can be enunciated this way: few international actors have the wherewithal to single-handedly tackle global issues. Calls for a form of global governance that is compatible with (some degree of) democracy have thus spread.
Nonetheless, such calls for more democratic global governance -that is, governance that
provides for more open and pluralistic decision-making processes regarding major global issues with repercussions on a planetary scale -often clash with allegations that, in practical terms, the responsibility for implementing this goal is limited to the technocratic elites of intergovernmental organizations, who have little or no connection with an electorate or genuinely global audiences (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009; Marks 2001) . It is skeptically said that international organizations entrusted with the tasks of global governance consist, in most cases, of "bureaucratic bargaining systems" among rulers, because these organizations are opaque and fundamentally antidemocratic (Dahl 1999; Dahrendorf 1999 Thus, examining the multifaceted relationship between democracy, global governance, and the modern system of states first demands, in my opinion, an attempt to catalogue and classify the very diverse theoretical approaches, lest we compare excessively disparate objects. In the literature there are at least two established ways of approaching the democratization of global governance, which I call, for the sake of didacticism, (a) traditional and (b) contemporary.
Traditional approaches to the "democratization of global governance" focus on the pluralization of state actors with a proven ability to participate in formal multilateral arrangements, to develop and vocalize their preferences (on an equal footing with other players), and to make decisions regarding the various agendas of international relations. These approaches are derived from the diagnosis that states (actors with territory and sovereignty) matter and, more than that, are necessary participants in efforts to solve the global public administration puzzle (see Hurrell 2008 for an extended account of "pluralism" in international relations).
Along these lines, Guy Hermet (2002: 44) argues that, although it is subject to the trends of globalization regarding a myriad of new issues, the territorial state remains the only actor able to halt, at least provisionally, the clashes that paralyze the global, regional, and national political agendas. It is an unavoidable reference, so to speak, for "space management."
Therefore, any measure to establish democratic governance in the international system will depend on sovereign states' effective capacity to collegially formulate and inscribe international regimes into the proceedings of public international law.
Darren Hawkins et al. (2006) have employed "principal-agent" theories (derived from modern representative democracy) to explain some of the decision-making processes occurring in multilateral international organizations. According to this analytical framework, "delegation" takes place when "an amount of political authority is conceded to an agent by a principal, empowering the former in the name of the latter" (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7 The traditional approach to the democratization of global governance also demands an emphasis on the concept of the "system of states." This concept resembles, in terms of method, the representative/constitutional conception of democracy, whereby citizens are able to influence international affairs through the national elections they participate in. As Susan Marks (2001: 50) summarizes it, it is as if democracy can only materialize through the "nation-state container." Furthermore, greater attention is paid to the formalities of international political participation, which are led (and almost monopolized) by sovereign states (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin 2010) .
If states are hubs of political loyalties par excellence, how is it possible to imagine a legitimate locus of power that is above and beyond sovereign states? For Robert Howse (2001) , this is a relatively simple mental operation: he proposes an analogy between the formal attribution of authority that states grant to international organizations on the one hand and the (actual or presumed) allocation of authority from individuals to state representatives on the other. Interstate multilateralism is the device by which relations within the system of states are legitimated, in the shadow of liberal contractualist formulas, in modern political theory.
However, it should be clear that the argument of multilateralism as an extension of domestic democracy will invariably prove fallacious because nondemocratic states make up a considerable portion of the membership of global international organizations. Additionally, as Miles Kahler (1992) has already convincingly demonstrated, the more members in a formal multilateral arrangement, the greater the tendency that "minilateral" practices will take place (that is, the formation of small "clubs" of actors with similar or compatible interests within the framework of international institutions).
In a nearly opposite direction to that of traditionalists, contemporary approaches take into In local domains the participatory processes of the demoi would take place in a direct fashion, and in more remote domains there would be mediation through representative mechanisms. In this context, the formation of a global assembly, encompassing all states and agencies, could be envisaged. This assembly would address the most salient global concerns (global health and disease; food supply and distribution; financial instability; foreign debt; climate change; disarmament; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; etc.).
Contrary to this view of global democracy (which he labels "Kantian"), Kazancigil (2002: 61-62) states that "it takes all states and nations to share similar worldviews, principles, and political systems, a condition that probably will never be met on a planetary scale." He argues the unfeasibility of a model based on the concept of a "global constituency," because it is a "distant perspective, almost utopian." He admits, as the most optimistic hypothesis, the existence of some regional democratic governance in the world today (namely, in parts of the EU), but argues that this reaches only a limited number of state and nonstate actors.
Singer (2004) contends that if the group to which one must justify his or her behavior is a tribe or a nation, its morality tends to be tribal or national. If, however, the communications revolution has created a global audience, one might feel the need to justify his or her behavior to the whole world. Such a change, for the author, creates the material basis for a new ethic that reaches all of the planet's inhabitants. It is therefore possible to argue that individuals suitably adapted to the new global dimension of political decisions will be able to think of social integration beyond the neighborhood, the city, or the country. Contemporaneously, the virtue of thinking of the "political" as existing beyond the territorial boundaries of the state seems to be a requirement.
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Regarding the possibility of applying democratic formulas to international relations, Habermas (1998) argues that a political community must -if it regards itself as democraticbe able to distinguish between those who are its members and those who are not. The selfreferential concept of "collective self-determination" refers to the logical space occupied by citizens brought together as members of a particular political community (as opposed to other political communities gathered under other states). This particular political community establishes itself as democratic when it is capable of elaborating its own standards and norms for the interactions it promotes with other political communities around the world. The solidarity forged by the population within a state is rooted in one particular collective identity, supported by historical references and moral persons. This is what shapes the nation and establishes its potential for self-administration.
A similar argument is put forward by Howse (2001) , for whom the applicability of the term "demos" in reference to issues related to the modern system of states remains questionable. The author elucidates his objection as follows: "as there is not a transnational demos, then transnational civil society will continue extracting its legitimacy from the ability to represent interests, values, and those stakeholders which have some domestic salience" (Howse 2001: 362) .
The two perspectives -traditional and contemporary -are highly relevant to studies on the democratization of international politics, either because of their potential or because of their limits. It is not my intention to propose a reflection on the topic of global governance democratization that necessarily evokes the "armor of the nation-state" reading (Marks 2001) nor to accept the idea of "global governance against the state" (Hermet 2001). After all, it is not a matter of pursuing the extremes of the debate but rather of advancing a useful proposal for understanding the ultimately constitutive problem of international politics.
Research Problem and Research Design
Given the "systemic anarchy" -and the absence of a global democratic system or a universal Leviathan -there surely are theoretical as well as empirical barriers to "democratizing" international politics. In this paper, the starting question was as follows: Considering the absence of a polity on a planetary scale, is there a way to speak of democratic political interactions in a system of territorial sovereign states?
First, it is important to recall that different approaches to the subject of democratization have led to different formulas for operationalizing "democracy" in the academic realm of International Relations (IR). Susan Marks (2001) , for instance, has set forth a tripartite division of the projects for the democratization of global governance, grouping them into (a) world government, (b) pan-national democracy, and (c) cosmopolitan democracy projects. While the first category refers, quite literally, to the possibility of building a global democratic state, and the second to the pool of existing democratic regimes in the world, the third combines 265/2015 GIGA Working Papers elements from (a) and (b), associating the growing democratization at the domestic level with the emergence of transnational and supranational institutions with the capacity to democratize contemporary international politics. Raffaele Marchetti (2012) , in a different fashion, has divided contemporary approaches into transnational and cosmopolitan, identifying at least three normative models for the purpose of applying democratic formulas to international politics (see Table 1 ). In order to grasp the degree of "transnational democracy" of different international institutions, Thomas Zweifel (2006) Table 2 ). Ranking  10th  2nd  3rd  8th  4th  1st  11th  7th  4th  4th  9th Source: Adapted from Zweifel (2006: 177) .
According to Zweifel, the direct confrontation between the UN and the WTO has benefited the latter. Based on the evaluation of its Security Council, the UN was found to be successful in criteria such as transparency and the capacity to offer public arguments (reason-giving).
Of the whole universe of cases and based on all of the criteria employed for comparison, the UN only outperformed the now defunct Organization of African Unity. The WTO -notwithstanding its difficulties in monitoring its members, its lack of transparency, and its poor in- positions. According to the criteria employed, the World Bank appeared to be slightly more used to democratizing processes than the IMF -based on the organizations' ability to share the underlying reasons for their decisions with policy stakeholders. Overall, the IMF and World Bank were neutral or deficient with regard to most of the indicators. Both received the grade "-1" for the "overrule criterion," which leads one to infer that when member states have consolidated their positions, the two multilateral banks can do little to resist them (see Table 2 ).
The absence of a mechanism to weigh Zweifel's operational criteria for transnational democracy is noteworthy. There is no hierarchy among indicators for the calculation of the index, as those indicators simply assume, in a somewhat vague and impressionistic manner, values ranging from "-1" (absence of democracy) to "+1" (presence of democracy). On this scale, "0" (zero) represents a dysfunctional democracy. Nonetheless, the unilinearity of indicators may distort the conclusions achieved, as there are certain elements that turn out to be more decisive than others for the functioning of democracy. For example, it might be claimed in defense of the UN that by privileging the Security Council in this measurement exercise, the author jettisoned all the political potential of the General Assembly, thereby throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.
More important than the index itself and the ranking developed by Thomas Zweifel are in fact the reflections on the subject that they provoke, beginning with the institutional conception of democracy the author evokes for his analysis. Arguably, what Zweifel delivers is not precisely a transnational ontology, since he brings together many institutions from domestic democracy as parameters. It seems inappropriate to expect that international courts and organizations can reproduce conventional democratic experiences in the same way contemporary nation-states would, given the absence of a global polity or global demos. However, the gravest problem, in my view, lies not in the study's "methodological statism" but in the hardly comparable objects, which include a court of justice, two multilateral banks, two global international organizations, and six regional international organizations (with rather discrepant ambitions and levels of institutionalization). Although laudable per se, this broad comparative enterprise cannot fully achieve its heuristic objectives.
In this paper I have opted to adapt the conceptual tools of conventional democratic theory in order to reach my goals. By applying the concept of "polyarchy" to the study of international politics, I attempt to subvert the original plan, inasmuch as this concept was conceived by social scientist Robert Dahl in the early 1950s, to approach institutional environments from the perspective of domestic polities.
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As far as Dahl's political pluralism is concerned, the polyarchization of a society -that is, the increase in levels of political participation and public contestation -should be seen as just "one aspect of democratization" (Dahl 2005: 17) . The conceptual parsimony found in this author's construct is consistent with his epistemological choice to treat democracy as a Weberian ideal-type that is unattainable in actual situations, both domestically and internationally.
Therefore, as one state develops into a political system that allows opposition, rivalry, or competition between the government and its adversaries, its perceived level of polyarchy increases; likewise, whenever one country expands the number of individuals and groups with access to institutional mechanisms for participation in political life, the degree of polyarchy increases. It must be pointed out, however, that a comprehensive system of public contestation and pluralism should not be mistaken for the full democratization of a society (see Fig However influential Dahl's construct might be, I am not speaking of a hard-to-grasp abstraction, but rather of quite the opposite. This is an elegant, academically sound, and straight- Table 3 ). 2 An intergovernmental organization (IGO) that includes more than one hundred member states and is representative of a relevant international regime, and yet allows for opposition to its ruling coalition, could possibly be thought of as a global polyarchy. Dahl (2005) employs his three-tiered classification to cover the main empirical possibilities for domestic societies: polyarchies, competitive oligarchies, and inclusive hegemonies. There is also a hidden fourth possibility: when there is neither participation nor contestation within a political society, the system should qualify as a closed hegemony. The ideal situation exists when the countryor in our case the IGO -reaches position III (see Figure 1 ).
My effort to assess the "polyarchization of IGOs" adopts different metrics and methodological pathways. Considering the practical challenges involved in this research, I have developed a scorecard to rate the IGOs with regard to each dimension of polyarchy (see Table 4 for coding). Say that 75 percent of my model is intergovernmental, while 25 percent goes transnational. In terms of participation and contestation, approximately 42 percent of an IGO's possible final score can come from its perceived ability to include states in decisionmaking procedures, whereas 33 percent comes from its ability to allow for contestation and 25 percent from its capacity to make nonstate actors take part in deliberations and decisionmaking procedures. As for eligibility criteria, two conditions must be met for an IGO to be considered "global" in scope: (a) a three-digit membership and (b) member states from at least three different continents.
To make this research project feasible, one needs to conceive of international organizations as universal and multilateral arenas capable of hosting some of the world's more power- Global issues represent a new reality that few agents are able to cope with. In this sense, the 23 IGOs 3 I have studied here, thanks to their universal focus, are perhaps those formal institutions that have the most advanced tools in public administration and are able to wield influence over fields as diverse and broad as telecommunications, human rights, environment, trade, intellectual property, finance, etc. From such representativeness comes a substantial part of the political authority acquired by global intergovernmental organizations (GIGOs) since the Cold War.
In light of the aforementioned aspects, the main hypothesis of this paper is as follows:
There may be a process of "polyarchization" in international politics underway, which is ar- 
Methodological Note

On the Construction of the Index
The global intergovernmental organizations studied here have primarily been classified according to their institutional design -that is, by, first, consulting their constitutive treaties, official documents, and all available literature on the subject and by, second, interviewing In accordance with its institutional design, the IMF emerges in this comparison as an NGO-averse organization, whose decision-making capacity lies in the hands of the stronger economic powers. Another possible explanation for the IMF's lower scores is the almost impervious technicality of debates relating to international finance (and weapons of mass destruction in the case of the IAEA). This could have been decisive in relegating these organizations to the bottom of the ranking. In addition, there is the Dahlian argument that global elites could have tacitly judged that incurring repression costs would be a more expensive strategy than making concessions to the lesser powers and nonstate actors on education and health issues (Dahl 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) . This same reasoning would not apply to economic and security agendas though. All in all, the results appear to be fairly consistent with the "high-versus-low-politics" cleavages in international relations -and reinforce their continued usefulness as a country-behavior predictor (see Figure 2 ). 1  2  1  2  2  0  2  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  1  2  1 When it comes to contestation, the five better-ranked GIGOs -UPU, ITU, UNWTO, WHO, and UNESCO -can easily be associated with "low-politics" or "technically oriented" international regimes. Another clue as to how GIGOs' institutional design may correspond to the political cleavages and power correlations can probably be found inside the organizations.
Again, one can easily infer, by examining the available data, the greater permissiveness regarding contesting behaviors within the ambit of technique-bound GIGOs, in sharp contrast to the situation within the bottom three GIGOs (IAEA, OPCW, and IBRD) (see Figure 3 ).
Among the most inclusive GIGOs, there will be those that combine state and nonstate participation in more balanced ways. Not surprisingly, UNESCO and WHO again receive good scores, whereas the IMF completely fails at including nonstate representatives in deliberative and decision-making procedures. Curiously, IAEA climbs many positions in this inclusiveness ranking and moves up to third place (see Figure 5 ). In terms of NGO-friendly GIGOs, the IBRD scores high, possibly because of the reforms it has undergone since the late 1980s, with a view to absorbing the harsh criticism it faced then and expanding the participation of global civil society in its decision-making procedures (Paloni and Zanardi 2006; Belém Lopes 2013 A few questions remain. In some cases, an inverse correlation between inclusiveness and contestation appears to exist. If this is actually so, why does it occur? A possible explanation for the alleged trade-off could be the complementary relationship between the two dimensions of the polyarchy concept. Think, for instance, about the pressure nonstate actors exercised some 15 years ago -for instance, in the famous protests against globalization that took place in Seattle and Genoa -in order to be recognized in formal negotiation environments.
That pressure would have increased if the nonstate actors had not been permitted to participate in sessions, but was diffused because they did eventually join in negotiations. In these situations, oppositional behavior was (at least partially) replaced by a new participatory stance. Although this argument has not yet been systematically tested, it deserves some consideration, especially if one looks at the World Bank and how it differs from the IMF in terms of its inclusion of NGOs in deliberative practices (Belém Lopes 2013).
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There is also a second question to grapple with: What should be done when contradictory processes take place "under the same roof"? The case of the UN provides an example: while the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council get some of the best grades, the UN Security Council drags the GIGO classification down due to its "exclusive club" structure and voting mechanisms. In the end, the UN qualifies as a middle-ranking organization, mostly because of the shadow of its Security Council, which reduces its polyarchical potential. Still, is it fair to treat the "various UNs" as one and the same (Jolly et al. 2009 )?
Another methodological question that has arisen during this research is as follows: Is it scientifically sound to combine "hard" (formal-institutional) and "soft" (extra-institutional)
indicators to make an index? Emphasizing the institutional hardware of GIGOs entails the risk of leaving most of the political essentials behind, because the processes that take place inside the organizations do not strictly correspond to the institutional settings (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004) . This is why I felt the need to use the "hard" and the "soft" dialogue, however problematic it may be from an epistemological viewpoint. (For an erudite account of the WHO's contemporary politics and a case for the integration of hard and soft variables, see Hein and Moon 2013.) Finally, I have faced the classic "small-N" research problem, given the limited number of GIGOs in the world today. According to experts, there are now some 300 active IGOs but only 10 to 15 percent of them qualify as GIGOs (Karns and Mingst 2004) . Thirty to forty is definitely not a comfortable number of single cases to deal with -either for inferential statistics or for in-depth case studies (George and Bennett 2005; Coppedge 2012 ). This difficulty and those listed previously suggest the need for more investment in this broad research agenda in order to generate better analytical gains in the future.
Conclusion
Ongoing debate on the democratization of international politics is a must, and one which no political science or IR academic can bypass. Susan Marks (2001) succinctly stated the reasons for this phenomenon: on the one hand, the commitment to democracy has never before been so widespread throughout the world; on the other, never before has the awareness of its empirical limitations been so acute.
In view of the literature, I insist on the need to assess the democratization of international international regimes, what is in fact at stake is less the ability to replicate the democratic formula (as we know it) to tackle the problematic issues of the international agenda than it is the authority that is increasingly vested in such institutions to fulfill the functions of global administration (even in nondemocratic ways). Therefore, intergovernmental organizations and international regimes are both important political actors and meta-political spaces (that is, microcosms) within the asymmetrical twenty-first-century system of global governance.
